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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Brittany A. Dunn-Pirio *
Timothy J. Huffstutter **
Sharon M. Carr ***
Mason D. Williams ****
INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys recent developments in criminal procedure
and law in Virginia. Because of space limitations, the authors have
limited their discussion to the most significant published appellate
decisions and legislation.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Finality of Orders
In Jefferson v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
was asked to determine whether the trial court’s amendment of its
final order to correct a scrivener’s error created a new final order
date.1 The trial court entered the sentencing order on August 28,
2017, but accidentally wrote “August 28, 2018.”2 On September 15,

* Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney, Special Victims Unit, Loudoun County Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office, Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2016, Washington & Lee
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**** Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2017, Washington & Lee University School of Law;
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1. __ Va. __, __, 840 S.E.2d 329, 331 (2020).
2. Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 330.
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2017, the trial court amended the sentencing order to correct the
date of entry to “August 28, 2017.”3
On October 3, 2017, Jefferson filed an appeal using the September 15, 2017 date as the date of the final order.4 The supreme court
dismissed the appeal as untimely because Jefferson filed his appeal more than thirty days after entry of the final order on August
28, 2017.5 The court affirmed the Court of Appeals of Virginia’s
judgment because the amendment to the sentencing order was
merely a scrivener’s error and did not “modify, vacate, or suspend
the judgment contained in the original order.”6
In Akers v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the finality of a sentencing order.7 In 2014, Akers pled
guilty to a drug charge and received a partially suspended sentence.8 In 2017, after being convicted of new offenses, the circuit
court revoked the entirety of his previous suspended sentence.9 Approximately four months later, Akers filed a motion for modification of sentence pursuant to Virginia Code section 19.2-303.10 Five
days prior to a hearing on the motion, Akers was transferred from
a regional jail to the Department of Corrections.11 The trial court
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Akers’ motion, and the court of appeals agreed.12
The supreme court determined that Akers’ sentencing order was
final twenty-one days after its entry pursuant to Rule 1:1.13 Virginia Code section 19.2-303 provides an exception to trial courts for
the modification of final orders in situations where the defendant
has not been transferred to the Department of Corrections.14 Accordingly, because Akers had been transferred to the Department
of Corrections, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to alter Akers’

3. Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 331.
4. Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 331.
5. Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 331.
6. Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 333.
7. 298 Va. 448, 450, 839 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2020).
8. Id. at 451, 839 S.E.2d at 905.
9. Id. at 451, 839 S.E.2d at 905.
10. Id. at 451, 839 S.E.2d at 905.
11. Id. at 451, 839 S.E.2d at 905.
12. Id. at 451–52, 839 S.E.2d at 905.
13. Id. at 452, 839 S.E.2d at 905.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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sentencing order.15 The supreme court also determined that Akers’
constitutional arguments were meritless.16
B. Batson Challenges
In Bethea v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the trial court violated the holding of Batson v.
Kentucky.17 The trial court had held that the prosecutor’s strike of
an African-American juror was not racially motivated.18 During
the Batson challenge, the prosecutor explained that “[s]he thought
that she had seen an emotional juror who had failed to raise her
hand to a specific voir dire question.”19 The defense conceded that
the prosecutor had offered a facially race-neutral reason for the
strike and told the trial court at the post-trial hearing that the
prosecutor’s stated reason for the strike was either a mistake because it was not supported by the transcript, or the prosecutor had
deliberately misrepresented the facts to the court.20 The supreme
court ruled that the appellant’s Batson challenge failed because a
prosecutor’s race-neutral reason to strike a juror cannot be both an
unintentional mistake and a pre-textual, purposeful misrepresentation.21
In Stevens v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered the trial court’s denial of Stevens’ challenge to the prosecution’s use of peremptory strikes against African-American jurors, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky.22 Stevens was convicted of
various robbery offenses.23 During voir dire, the prosecution then
challenged Stevens’ use of peremptory strikes against white jurors,
pursuant to Georgia v. McCollum.24 On appeal, Stevens challenged
the trial court’s ruling as to one of the jurors challenged by the

15. Akers, 298 Va. at 453, 839 S.E.2d at 906.
16. Id. at 454, 839 S.E.2d at 907.
17. Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 735, 831 S.E.2d 670, 672 (2019) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
18. Id. at 735, 831 S.E.2d at 672.
19. Id. at 751, 831 S.E.2d at 681.
20. Id. at 752, 831 S.E.2d at 681.
21. Id. at 754, 831 S.E.2d at 682.
22. Stevens v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 280, 286–87, 826 S.E.2d 895, 898 (2019)
(citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79).
23. Id. at 286, 826 S.E.2d at 898.
24. Id. at 299–305, 826 S.E.2d at 905–07 (citing Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42
(1992)).
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prosecution.25 Defense counsel provided an explanation for the
strike, which the court determined was improper, and the court
restored the juror to the venire.26
Following a lengthy discussion of the history of jury selection
and the development of Batson and McCollum, the court of appeals
addressed Stevens’ challenge to the trial court’s McCollum ruling.27 The court concluded that the Commonwealth made a valid
McCollum challenge and that Stevens’ reasons for striking the juror were pretextual.28 Additionally, the court concluded that the
trial court had not applied an incorrect legal standard.29 Accordingly, the court affirmed Stevens’ convictions.30
C. Probation
In Fazili v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia considered whether a condition of probation that the defendant “have
no use of any device that can access internet unless approved by
his Probation Officer” violated his right to freedom of speech.31 The
court of appeals held that circuit courts can impose, “as a condition
of probation, a reasonable ban on internet access provided such ban
is narrowly tailored to effectuate either a rehabilitative or publicsafety purpose.”32 However, in this specific case, there was no evidence that the defendant used computers or the internet to commit
object sexual penetration and the circuit court did not articulate a
justification for how “imposing this restriction on [the defendant’s]
fundamental right to free speech would serve any rehabilitative or
public safety purpose.”33 The court of appeals remanded the case
so the trial court could explain its justification for the internet ban
if it still chose to impose that restriction.34
In Cilwa v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the revocation of Cilwa’s suspended sentence.35 Cilwa had
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 287, 826 S.E.2d at 898.
Id. at 287–88, 826 S.E.2d at 898–99.
Id. at 288–303, 826 S.E.2d at 899–906.
Id. at 303–05, 826 S.E.2d at 906–07.
Id. at 306, 826 S.E.2d at 908.
Id. at 306, 826 S.E.2d at 908.
71 Va. App. 239, 248, 835 S.E.2d 87, 91 (2019).
Id. at 251, 835 S.E.2d at 93.
Id. at 253, 835 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 253, 835 S.E.2d at 94.
298 Va. 259, 262, 836 S.E.2d 378, 379 (2019).
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been originally sentenced in March 2008, and her sentence included one year of supervised probation.36 Following a series of new
arrests and revocation hearings, Cilwa agreed to voluntarily extend her probation indefinitely in order to complete substance
abuse treatment.37 Accordingly, in September 2009, the trial court
entered an order extending Cilwa’s period of probation indefinitely.38 Cilwa failed to complete a substance abuse program and
continued to commit new offenses.39 At a revocation hearing in
2015, Cilwa argued for the first time that the September 2009 order was void ab initio.40 She also contended that her period of suspension ended when she completed the first substance abuse treatment program.41 The trial court and Court of Appeals of Virginia
rejected these arguments.42
The supreme court also rejected these arguments, ruling that
the September 2009 order was not void ab initio because the trial
court had subject matter jurisdiction when it entered the order.43
The trial court had the statutory authority to increase the period
of probation pursuant to Virginia Code section 19.2-304, and the
parties had agreed to extend the period of probation.44 Moreover,
the court ruled that probation is not a contract, and the parties had
not conditioned the additional period of probation on any requirement, regardless.45
In Garibaldi v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether a trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that the defendant could not drive a vehicle for ten years,
even if eligible to be licensed as a condition of Garibaldi’s suspended sentence, because the ten-year period was longer than any
statutorily prescribed punishment.46 Garibaldi had pled guilty to
numerous driving offenses, including driving under the influence

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 263, 836 S.E.2d at 379.
Id. at 263, 836 S.E.2d at 379–80.
Id. at 263, 836 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 263–64, 836 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 264, 836 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 264, 836 S.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 264–65, 836 S.E.2d at 380–81.
Id. at 266, 268–71, 836 S.E.2d at 381, 383–84.
Id. at 267–70, 836 S.E.2d at 382–83.
Id. at 271–72, 836 S.E.2d at 384–85.
71 Va. App. 64, 66–68, 833 S.E.2d 915, 917 (2019).
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as a subsequent offense in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2266 and section 18.2-270.47
The court of appeals noted that Virginia Code section 18.2-266
provides for the revocation of driving licenses upon conviction as
provided for in Virginia Code section 46.2-391(B).48 That section
provides that once revoked, an individual may petition to have a
license reinstated after a period of five years.49 Garibaldi argued
that the ten-year period of non-driving in his sentence conflicted
with the statutes.50 The court disagreed, holding that there is a
difference between the right to drive and licensure to drive.51 The
court also pointed out that the sections Garibaldi referenced in his
argument concerned sentences, not probation.52
D. Appellate Procedure
In Watson v. Commonwealth, the appellant argued that he had
the proper standing to appeal not only his convictions, but also the
convictions of defendants similarly situated to him, who were convicted of multiple offenses and whose sentences were shorter than
statutorily prescribed.53 The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that
standing is relevant when a judgment is challenged as being void
ab initio and, as a result, Watson lacked the proper standing to
challenge the sentences imposed for other felons.54 And, although
the court may sua sponte vacate a circuit court’s order as void ab
initio, it declined to do so here because of the “possible due process
concerns that may arise if the 11 other felons’ sentences [were]
void[ed] and . . . need[ed] to be resentenced.”55
In Ducharme v. Commonwealth, the appellant raised two arguments on appeal regarding the denial of his motion to suppress.56
The Court of Appeals of Virginia did not address the substance of
the appellant’s argument because he failed to cite any authority for
his argument, but rather only wrote “two paragraphs of conclusory
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 66, 833 S.E.2d at 916–17.
Id. at 68, 833 S.E.2d at 917.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-391(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Garibaldi, 71 Va. App. at 68–69, 833 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 68–69, 833 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 69, 833 S.E.2d at 918.
297 Va. 347, 349–50, 827 S.E.2d 782, 783 (2019).
Id. at 352–53, 827 S.E.2d at 785.
Id. at 353–54, 827 S.E.2d at 785–86.
70 Va. App. 668, 672–73, 830 S.E.2d 924, 927 (2019).
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statements” and “only reference[d] . . . the Fourth Amendment . . .
in two quotations from cases stating the applicable standard of review.”57 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.58
The court of appeals considered appellant’s third argument challenging a jury instruction provided by the trial court for use of a
communication device to solicit a minor for the production of child
pornography, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-374.3(B).59
The appellant proposed a jury instruction that required him to
know the victim was less than eighteen years old, while the Commonwealth’s instruction required him to know or have reason to
believe the victim was a minor.60 In considering the legislature’s
intent, the court of appeals held that “proof the defendant ‘has reason to believe’ the subject of the solicitation is a child is an alternative finding that the trier of fact may make to sustain a conviction.”61 As a result, the court of appeals found that the trial court
did not err in refusing the appellant’s jury instruction and providing the instruction offered by the Commonwealth.62
In Trevathan v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that the court of appeals erred by dismissing rather than
denying a defendant’s petition for appeal after finding that he
“waived his ‘right to appeal.’”63 The defendant had entered pleas of
guilty to multiple offenses for which the trial court ultimately
found him guilty, and the trial court found the defendant’s pleas
were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.64 In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court explained that although
a defendant who pleads guilty has very limited grounds upon
which he may appeal, he “still retains the statutory right to file a
notice of appeal and present a petition for appeal to the Court of
Appeals of Virginia.”65
In Reed v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia considered the appellant’s argument that the Commonwealth was
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 673–74, 830 S.E.2d at 927.
Id. at 674, 830 S.E.2d at 928.
Id. at 670, 675, 830 S.E.2d at 925, 928.
Id. at 675, 830 S.E.2d at 928.
Id. at 677–79, 830 S.E.2d at 929–30.
Id. at 679, 830 S.E.2d at 930.
297 Va. 697, 697–98, 831 S.E.2d 725, 726 (2019).
Id. at 697, 831 S.E.2d at 726.
Id. at 697–98, 831 S.E.2d at 726.
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barred from presenting a new argument after remand from the Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Virginia.66
Reed was convicted in circuit court and appealed to the Court of
Appeals of Virginia, which affirmed.67 Reed’s subsequent petition
to the Supreme Court of Virginia was refused.68 Reed then filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United
States, which was held in abeyance pending the result of another
similar case, Carpenter v. United States.69 After the Supreme Court
decided Carpenter, it granted Reed’s petition, vacated the judgment below, and remanded to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
which remanded the case further to the court of appeals for consideration in light of Carpenter.70
In a supplemental brief, the Commonwealth argued for the first
time that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.71 Reed then filed a motion to strike the Commonwealth’s
good-faith argument, arguing that the Commonwealth was barred
from presenting it due to the Commonwealth’s failure to raise it
during the first argument.72 The court of appeals then found in favor of the Commonwealth, denying Reed’s motion to strike in a
footnote.73 Reed appealed again to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
which vacated the court of appeals’ order and remanded the case
back for Reed to be presented with an opportunity to be heard on
the good-faith argument.74
On second remand, the court denied Reed’s waiver argument.75
Looking to Collins v. Commonwealth, the court held that permitting the Commonwealth to raise a new argument after remand was
merely an extension of the right-result-different-reason doctrine.76

66. 71 Va. App. 164, 171–74, 834 S.E.2d 505, 509–10 (2019). This case is also addressed
under the subheading “Fourth Amendment Issues.” See infra section I.H.
67. Id. at 167, 834 S.E.2d at 507.
68. Id. at 167, 834 S.E.2d at 507.
69. Id. at 167–68, 834 S.E.2d at 507 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018)).
70. Id. at 168, 834 S.E.2d at 507.
71. Id. at 168, 834 S.E.2d at 507.
72. Id. at 168, 834 S.E.2d at 507–08.
73. Id. at 168, 834 S.E.2d at 508.
74. Id. at 168–69, 834 S.E.2d at 508.
75. Id. at 171–73, 834 S.E.2d at 509–10.
76. Id. at 171–73, 834 S.E.2d at 509–10 (citing Collins v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 207,
824 S.E.2d 485 (2019)).
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Thus, the Commonwealth was permitted to raise the good-faith argument, as it was based on a purely legal ground.77
E. Expert Witnesses
In Wakeman v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld the court of appeals’ opinion affirming that the trial court
did not err in qualifying a forensic nurse as an expert witness.78
Wakeman argued that the court of appeals erred in affirming the
trial court’s decision to qualify the forensic nurse as “an expert Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner” (“SANE”) because she never took the
certification exam to be certified as a SANE.79
In determining there was no error, the supreme court focused on
the fact that Wakeman conceded that the nurse “possessed more
knowledge on the topic of sexual assault forensic examination than
the average person,” and that Rule 2:702(a) “does not require that
an expert carry a certification in order to qualify as expert and that
the General Assembly has not enacted a statutory bar to uncertified SANEs testifying as experts in the area of sexual assault forensic examinations.”80
In Watson v. Commonwealth, the appellant argued the trial
court erred in limiting the scope of his expert witness’ testimony as
it related to eyewitness confidence in perpetrator selection and unconscious transference.81 The Supreme Court of Virginia found the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding portions of the
expert’s intended eyewitness identification testimony because the
trial court had the discretion to permit or exclude testimony—particularly here, where the trial court questioned the expert at length
outside the jury’s presence, evincing its consideration of those topics for which the appellate courts had previously deemed expert
testimony useful.82 Furthermore, the trial court determined por-

77. Id. at 172, 834 S.E.2d at 509.
78. 298 Va. 412, 413, 838 S.E.2d 732, 733 (2020).
79. Id. at 412, 838 S.E.2d at 733.
80. Id. at 413, 838 S.E.2d at 733.
81. 298 Va. 197, 204, 835 S.E.2d 906, 909 (2019).
82. Id. at 206–07, 835 S.E.2d at 910–11.
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tions of the expert’s testimony were irrelevant given the unsuggestive manner in which law enforcement presented photos to the victim for possible identification.83
The supreme court also held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to give a proffered jury instruction, which
Watson claimed was “essential [to his] defense theory that [the victim’s] eyewitness testimony lacked credibility,” because the trial
court instructed the jury on “its role as the judges of the facts, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of evidence.”84 The trial
court also instructed the jury as to the defendant’s presumption of
innocence and the Commonwealth’s beyond a reasonable doubt
burden of proof, and Watson had an opportunity to thoroughly
cross-examine the victim on his identification confidence and highlight his concerns to the jury in closing arguments.85
F. Juvenile Procedure
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the trial court in Bardales v. Commonwealth did not err in its interpretation of a juvenile defendant’s plea agreement.86 The agreement specifically contemplated that the defendant was to receive “a blended sentence
that would allow him to serve the portion of any active sentence in
the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice to the extent
that he is eligible for such placement.”87
Because the plain language stated that the defendant would receive a blended sentence and be put in the Department of Juvenile
Justice (“DJJ”) to the extent eligible, and did not limit the circuit
court’s ability to sentence the defendant to life, logically the court
must be able to place him somewhere other than DJJ after he
turned twenty-one.88 Thus, defendant’s arguments that the agreement prevented any incarceration in Department of Corrections
custody ignored the plain language of the agreement and would
lead to an absurd result.89

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 204, 206, 835 S.E.2d at 909–11.
Id. at 210, 835 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 210, 835 S.E.2d at 912–13.
71 Va. App. 737, 746, 840 S.E.2d 14, 19 (2020).
Id. at 743–44, 840 S.E.2d at 17–18.
Id. at 744, 840 S.E.2d at 18.
Id. at 744–45, 840 S.E.2d at 18.

DUNN-PIRIO-MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

11/29/2020 9:53 PM

77

G. Juror Selection
In Keepers v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the trial court erred when it determined that
two jurors could impartially sit.90 On appeal, the defendant
claimed that the trial court should have struck two jurors.91 While
the first juror’s Facebook account “liked” a news story about the
defendant being denied bond and commented that the defendant
should receive capital punishment, the juror’s explanation that the
Facebook account was jointly shared with her husband, that she
had not “like[d]” the story or written the comment, and that her
views differed from that of her husband, combined with the trial
court’s opportunity to observe the juror, supported the trial court’s
finding that she could sit fairly and impartially.92 Similarly, the
court deferred to the trial court in its resolution of the second juror’s conflicting and equivocal statements because of the trial
court’s ability to observe the juror’s tone, demeanor, and emphasis
placed on words not captured by the record.93 In the full context of
the record taken as a whole, the trial court’s determination that
the second juror could sit impartially was supported.94
H. Fourth Amendment Issues
In Reed v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held,
after remand from the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Virginia in light of Carpenter v. United States,
that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.95
Reed was convicted after the Commonwealth obtained cell site location information (“CSLI”) without a warrant through an ex-parte
court order pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, and the
Virginia equivalent.96

90. 72 Va. App. 17, 42–43, 840 S.E.2d 575, 588 (2020).
91. Id. at 42, 840 S.E.2d 587.
92. Id. at 43–44, 840 S.E.2d at 588.
93. Id. at 44–47, 840 S.E.2d at 588–90.
94. See id. at 44–45, 840 S.E.2d at 589.
95. Reed v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 164, 168–69, 177, 834 S.E.2d 505, 507–08, 512
(2019) (citing Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)).
96. Id. at 167, 170, 834 S.E.2d at 507–09 (first citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703; and then citing
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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Reconsidering in light of Carpenter, which held that obtaining
CSLI was a search under the Fourth Amendment, the court did not
decide whether the search was unconstitutional, but held that, in
any event, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.97 As objectively reasonable good faith includes searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently-invalidated statutes, the Commonwealth’s conduct in relying on the statutes in
this case, which were not clearly unconstitutional, was reasonable.98 The court declined to order exclusion of the CSLI and affirmed Reed’s conviction.99
The trial court in Jones v. Commonwealth erred by denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress where an officer initiated a traffic
stop after the defendant, approaching an intersection, “activated
his turn signal and changed lanes, crossing over a single, solid
white line immediately before the intersection.”100 Cocaine and marijuana were discovered inside the vehicle.101
At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth conceded that a
traffic violation had not occurred, but argued that the officer’s mistake of law was reasonable.102 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia reversed, holding that, as there was no statutory ambiguity, the officer’s mistake of law was not reasonable.103 The court
further held that the exclusionary rule applied, as the only explanation for the mistake was inadequate study of the law, which
should not be rewarded by permitting the Commonwealth to proceed.104
In Hill v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress drugs found
as a result of a seizure, where, as officers approached the defendant
seated in a car in a high-crime area, the defendant turned his back
to them and began digging and reaching for something out of sight
of the officers, and did not cease such conduct when the officers
yelled seven to ten times for him to show his hands.105 Applying
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 173–75, 834 S.E.2d at 510–11.
Id. at 174–75, 834 S.E.2d at 510–11.
Id. at 175, 834 S.E.2d at 511.
71 Va. App. 375, 379, 836 S.E.2d 710, 712 (2019).
Id. at 379, 836 S.E.2d at 712.
Id. at 379, 836 S.E.2d at 712.
Id. at 382–83, 836 S.E.2d at 714.
Id. at 383–84, 836 S.E.2d at 714–15.
297 Va. 804, 816–17, 832 S.E.2d 33, 40 (2019).
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the reasonable suspicion test from Terry v. Ohio, the totality of the
circumstances here showed that the officers, “at the time of the seizure, could reasonably have suspected” that defendant was reaching for a weapon inside the car and thus understandably feared for
their safety.106 The officers’ seizure of defendant to determine if he
had a weapon was not unreasonable, thus the trial court correctly
denied the motion to suppress.107
In Merid v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld a search under the community caretaker exception to the
Fourth Amendment.108 After receiving concerning text messages
about joining their dead mother and being unable to contact Merid,
Merid’s brother contacted police for a welfare check.109 When police
arrived with Merid’s brother, they observed the car Merid drove—
which was registered to another person—in the parking lot of the
apartment building.110 Police knocked on the door and heard a
male voice answer, saying he needed to get dressed.111 As officers
continued knocking, they heard an “alarming” garbling noise, as
well as moans.112 Police forced open the door and observed Merid
on the couch, stabbing himself repeatedly in the throat.113 Police
wrestled the knife away from Merid and called paramedics.114
When the paramedics arrived, police conducted a security sweep of
the bedroom, the only other room of the apartment they had not
seen, and discovered a woman’s body tied to a chair.115 Merid was
tried and convicted for the abduction and murder of the woman.116
Merid moved to suppress the evidence recovered as a result of
the entry and sweep of the apartment.117 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia determined that the initial entry into the apartment complied with the community caretaker exception to the Fourth
Amendment.118 Moreover, the sweep of the bedroom was no more
106. Id. at 812–13, 821–22, 832 S.E.2d at 38, 43 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
107. Id. at 822, 832 S.E.2d at 43.
108. 72 Va. App. 104, 111–12, 841 S.E.2d 873, 876–77 (2020), appeal docketed, No.
200799 (Va., Nov. 4, 2020).
109. Id. at, 109, 841 S.E.2d at 875–76.
110. Id. at 109–10, 841 S.E.2d at 876.
111. Id. at 110, 841 S.E.2d at 876.
112. Id. at 110, 841 S.E.2d at 876.
113. Id. at 110, 841 S.E.2d at 876.
114. Id. at 110, 841 S.E.2d at 876.
115. Id. at 110–11, 841 S.E.2d at 876.
116. Id. at 111, 841 S.E.2d at 876–77.
117. Id. at 111, 841 S.E.2d at 876.
118. Id. at 111–12, n.3, 841 S.E.2d at 876–77, n.3.
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intrusive than necessary to ensure the safety of the paramedics
and to check to see if anyone else in the apartment needed assistance.119 The court of appeals concluded that once officers have entered pursuant to the community caretaker exception to the Fourth
Amendment, they may conduct a reasonable cursory sweep of the
premises.120 In this case, the officers reasonably believed that
Merid may have been trying to commit suicide, and once inside,
they acted reasonably.121
I. Miranda Issues
In Knight v. Commonwealth, police initiated a traffic stop for
failure to have front and rear license plates.122 Knight, the driver,
explained that he had just bought the car at an auction, and the
temporary paper tag must have fallen off; Knight was unable to
provide the car’s registration.123 The police officers returned to
their vehicle and discussed ways to search Knight’s car.124 Dispatch advised that Knight had an outstanding warrant for unpaid
court costs, and the officers believed they could search the whole
car as a search incident to arrest.125 Police ordered Knight out of
the car and began searching the entire car.126 Throughout this
search, one officer searched the car—not documenting the items or
calling them out to his partner—while the other officer remained
with Knight at the rear of the vehicle.127 In searching the contents
of Knight’s backpack, police recovered a gun, which was not documented on the PD Form 924, “Vehicle Tow/Impound Record.”128
Knight moved to suppress the evidence recovered as a result of the
search and entered a conditional guilty plea to felon in possession
of a firearm and carrying a concealed weapon following the trial
court’s denial of the motion to suppress.129

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 118, 841 S.E.2d at 880.
Id. at 118–19, 841 S.E.2d at 880.
Id. at 116–17, 841 S.E.2d at 879.
71 Va. App. 771, 778, 839 S.E.2d 911, 914 (2020).
Id. at 778, 839 S.E.2d at 914.
Id. at 778, 839 S.E.2d at 914–15.
Id. at 778–79, 839 S.E.2d at 914–15.
Id. at 779–80, 839 S.E.2d at 915.
Id. at 779–80, 839 S.E.2d at 915.
Id. at 780, 839 S.E.2d at 915.
Id. at 777, 782, 839 S.E.2d at 914, 916.
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The trial court concluded that officers had not engaged in a valid
inventory search because police had a pretextual motive in conducting the inventory, and police compliance with inventory procedures was “slipshod” at best.130 The Court of Appeals of Virginia
agreed, concluding that officers had not engaged in a valid inventory of the car because they were motivated by an investigatory
purpose, rather than the community caretaker exception.131 The
court went on to conclude that the gun would not have been inevitably discovered because that exception requires an independent
lawful source of discovery, which was not present.132 The only
search was the police’s unlawful one, and there would not have
been a separate inventory of the vehicle later because police removed the contraband.133 Accordingly, the court reversed the suppression court, ordered the contents of the unlawful search suppressed, and remanded to permit Knight to withdraw his guilty
plea.134
In Keepers v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion
to suppress statements defendant made on two separate days to
police.135 Although the defendant was questioned at police headquarters on the first day, she was not in custody, as she accompanied police there willingly, was not restrained, was not locked in
the questioning room, and was not “booked” or engaged in any of
the other formal incidents of arrest.136 Further, the officers did not
exert any force upon or restrain her, questioned her in a conversational manner, advised her that she was not in trouble, told her
she was free to leave, did not search her, and provided her with
food and water.137 Thus, the trial court’s determination that she
was not in custody, as a reasonable person would have felt free to
leave, was not error.138

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 783–86, 839 S.E.2d at 917–19.
Id. at 786–87, 839 S.E.2d at 918–19.
Id. at 788–89, 839 S.E.2d at 919–20.
Id. at 789, 839 S.E.2d at 920.
Id. at 791–92, 839 S.E.2d at 921.
72 Va. App. 17, 47, 840 S.E.2d 575, 590 (2020).
Id. at 33–36, 840 S.E.2d at 583–85.
Id. at 36, 840 S.E.2d at 584–85.
Id. at 36, 840 S.E.2d at 584–85.
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On the second day, the officers’ remarks that their duty to advise
defendant of her Miranda rights was a “procedural issue” that “really doesn’t change anything” did not dilute her Miranda rights
and invalidate her waiver.139 The defendant, an intelligent and articulate college student, was also told that she was free to refuse to
answer any questions and could stop talking at any time she
chose.140 She did not express confusion or hesitation and declined
to terminate her conversations with the police when she was told
that there was an attorney waiting for her at the jail.141 Thus, the
record supported the trial court’s determination that she voluntarily and intelligently waived her rights and that her statements
were voluntary.142
J. Speedy Trial
In Young v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that the defendant had waived his speedy trial defense, as he had
failed to object to a continuance that was initiated by the trial court
after a late disclosure of evidence by the Commonwealth.143 The
defendant’s statements that he would not be ready for trial and did
not want the continuance counted against him for speedy trial
were not sufficient to amount to an affirmative objection as required by Virginia Code section 19.2-243.144 While Young did not
agree to or request the continuance, he also did not affirmatively
object on the record, which amounted to acquiescence.145
K. Right to Counsel
In Weatherholt v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a defendant’s right to counsel was not violated
when he appeared before the circuit court without counsel to indicate whether or not he wished to have new counsel appointed due
to his current attorney’s license being temporarily suspended.146
The supreme court found that the hearing was not a critical stage
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 36–37, 840 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. at 37, 840 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. at 37, 840 S.E.2d at 585.
Id. at 37–38, 840 S.E.2d at 585.
297 Va. 443, 452–53, 829 S.E.2d 548, 553 (2019).
Id. at 452–53, 829 S.E.2d at 553.
Id. at 452–53, 829 S.E.2d at 553.
298 Va. 438, 447, 839 S.E.2d 492, 497 (2020).
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of the proceedings at which counsel’s absence would give rise to a
presumption of prejudice.147 Since the purpose of the hearing was
to advise the defendant of the status of his case and to determine
his wishes regarding the appointment of counsel, a decision unrepresented defendants are frequently required to make as a matter
of course in criminal proceedings, the defendant did not require the
assistance of a trained attorney to formulate a response.148
L. Evidence
In Jenkins v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered the admissibility standard for hearsay in a revocation
proceeding.149 Jenkins had been convicted in 2003 of fraud offenses
and sentenced to twenty years in prison with fourteen years suspended.150 Jenkins violated probation in 2010, 2014, and 2018.151
At the 2010 revocation proceeding, Jenkins pled guilty to violating
the terms of probation, and the revocation court received evidence
in the form of a report from a probation officer as to the violations
(“the 2010 report”).152 At the 2018 revocation proceeding, Jenkins
conceded violating probation, and the Commonwealth introduced
the 2010 report as to sentencing.153 Jenkins objected, contending
that the 2010 report was inadmissible hearsay.154 The court admitted the report, and Jenkins appealed.155
The court of appeals noted that there are different standards for
the admissibility of hearsay evidence, depending on whether the
proceeding is the guilt phase or the sentencing phase.156 The court
reasoned that revocation proceedings operate like criminal trials:
generally, there is a guilt phase and a sentencing phase.157 Accordingly, because the Commonwealth introduced the 2010 report in
the sentencing phase of the revocation proceeding, there had to be

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 446–47, 839 S.E.2d at 496–97.
Id. at 446, 839 S.E.2d at 496–97.
71 Va. App. 334, 342, 835 S.E.2d 918, 922 (2019).
Id. at 339, 835 S.E.2d at 921.
Id. at 339–40, 835 S.E.2d at 921.
Id. at 340, 835 S.E.2d at 921–22.
Id. at 341, 835 S.E.2d at 922.
Id. at 341, 835 S.E.2d at 922.
Id. at 341, 835 S.E.2d at 922.
Id. at 343, 835 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 345, 835 S.E.2d at 924.
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“some indicia of reliability” to the report.158 The court concluded
that there was some indicia of reliability to the report and affirmed
the revocation of Jenkins’ suspension.159
In Mooney v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia assumed without deciding that the trial court erred when it allowed
a prosecutor to proffer quoted testimony from a newspaper article
that was not admitted into evidence during a probation revocation
hearing because it violated the defendant’s due process rights, and
held that this error was harmless.160
During the probation revocation hearing, the defendant
acknowledged that he was convicted of new felonies.161 The prosecutor read a newspaper article that quoted the victim’s testimony
from the trial of the new convictions.162 The supreme court explained that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the defendant conceded he was convicted of additional felonies and the judge revoked less than the prosecutor’s recommendations.163
M. Jury Instructions
A jury convicted the defendant in Davison v. Commonwealth of
various offenses, including forcible sodomy and aggravated sexual
battery.164 On appeal, Davison argued that the trial court erred in
providing jury instructions that combined the alternative theories
of force, the victim’s mental incapacity, or the victim’s physical
helplessness as the means by which Davison committed the sexual
acts against the victim’s will.165
The Court of Appeals of Virginia determined that the elements
of both crimes were the same; that is, “(1) that Davison committed
the . . . sexual acts against the victim and (2) that those acts were
committed without [the victim’s] consent and against her will.”166
158. Id. at 347–48, 835 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Blunt v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 1,
9, 741 S.E.2d 56, 60 (2013)).
159. Id. at 349–52, 835 S.E.2d at 926–27.
160. 297 Va. 434, 435–36, 828 S.E.2d 795, 795 (2019).
161. Id. at 435–36, 828 S.E.2d at 795.
162. Id. at 436–37, 828 S.E.2d at 796.
163. Id. at 437–39, 828 S.E.2d at 796–97.
164. 298 Va. 177, 177, 836 S.E.2d 390, 390 (2019).
165. Id. at 177, 836 S.E.2d at 390.
166. Id. at 178, 836 S.E.2d at 391.
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The court of appeals determined that jury unanimity was not required as to the means for committing the offense.167 Accordingly,
it is immaterial if some jurors determined that Davison committed
the acts by force, while others believed Davison exploited the victim’s mental incapacity.168 The Supreme Court of Virginia adopted
this reasoning.169 Accordingly, the court affirmed Davison’s convictions, determining that the trial court properly instructed the
jury.170
N. Sentencing
In Burnham v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that a trial court may revoke a defendant’s suspended sentence based on his failure to maintain good behavior, even if the
preceding sentencing order pronouncing the suspension does not
contain an express condition of good behavior.171 Virginia Code section 19.2-306(A) provides, in pertinent part, “[i]f neither a probation period nor a period of suspension was fixed by the court, then
the court may revoke the suspension for any cause the court deems
sufficient that occurred within the maximum period for which
the defendant might originally have been sentenced to be imprisoned.”172 Accordingly, because the sentencing order challenged by
the defendant did not pronounce a specific period of suspension or
period of probation, the trial court was permitted to revoke the defendant’s suspended sentence for any cause it deemed sufficient,
as long as the new crime occurred within the maximum time for
which the defendant could have originally been sentenced.173
Given that, the defendant’s felony suspended sentence revocation
was upheld, while his revocation for the misdemeanor was overturned because the one-year sentence that was pronounced by order in 2008 had long expired by the time the trial court attempted
to revoke the balance in 2016.174

167. Id. at 178, 836 S.E.2d at 391.
168. Id. at 178, 836 S.E.2d at 391.
169. Id. at 179, 836 S.E.2d at 391.
170. Id. at 179, 836 S.E.2d at 391.
171. 298 Va. 109, 114–15, 833 S.E.2d 872, 874 (2019).
172. Id. at 115–16, 833 S.E.2d at 874–75 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-306(A) (Repl.
Vol. 2015)).
173. Id. at 114–16, 833 S.E.2d at 874–75.
174. Id. at 118, 833 S.E.2d at 876.
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The supreme court also rejected the defendant’s contention that
his requirement of good behavior ended with the expiration of his
supervised probation.175 The court distinguished probation from
good behavior, holding that they “constitute distinct, if complementary, requirements.”176 The court maintained that “[o]nce the period of probation ended, the requirement of good behavior remained alongside the suspended sentence. To hold otherwise
would transform a suspended sentence, meant to incentivize reform and rehabilitation, into a purposeless act.”177
In Commonwealth v. Watson, the Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it determined the appellant’s
sentences were void ab initio because he was sentenced on each of
his four convictions for use of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1, to three
years’ imprisonment, instead of five years for his second or subsequent convictions as the code requires.178 The Supreme Court of
Virginia held that a sentence lower than that prescribed by statute
for an offense is erroneous, but it is “merely voidable, not void,” and
therefore not void ab initio.179 Further, as a result of Rule 1:1,
which provides that the trial court retains jurisdiction for twentyone days after entry of judgment, the trial court here lacked the
jurisdiction to correct the appellant’s sentences a decade post-sentencing.180
O. Inconsistent Verdicts
The rationale behind permitting inconsistent verdicts was reiterated in McQuinn v. Commonwealth.181 In that case, the Supreme
Court of Virginia refused to find that the Court of Appeals of Virginia erred in affirming the defendant’s conviction for the use of a
firearm in the commission of a robbery when a jury acquitted him
of the predicate robbery.182

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 117–18, 833 S.E.2d at 876.
Id. at 116, 833 S.E.2d at 875.
Id. at 116, 833 S.E.2d at 875.
297 Va. 355, 357, 827 S.E.2d 778, 779 (2019).
Id. at 361, 827 S.E.2d at 781.
Id. at 357, 361–62, 827 S.E.2d at 779, 781.
__ Va. __, __, 839 S.E.2d 907, 908 (2020).
Id. at __, 839 S.E.2d at 909, 911.
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The supreme court noted that a similar argument had been rejected in Reed v. Commonwealth.183 As a reviewing court cannot
determine if the jury erred in failing to convict the defendant of the
predicate offense, erred in convicting the defendant of the compound offense, or may have decided to be lenient and only convict
him of one offense, “it is unclear whose ox has been gored.”184 Given
the respect Virginia law gives to jury secrecy and deliberations, it
is unlikely that a reviewing court can discover which “error” occurred, and, as the Commonwealth cannot challenge an acquittal,
a new trial as a matter of course is “hardly satisfactory.”185
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Murder and Crimes of Violence
In Watson-Scott v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the appellant’s second-degree murder conviction
when the appellant intentionally fired multiple shots from a handgun down a city street, resulting in the homicide of a woman in the
passenger seat of a car.186 There was no evidence that WatsonScott had intentionally shot at a specific person.187 The supreme
court considered “whether the legal standard for establishing malice requires proof that the defendant’s actions were targeted at a
particular individual or group of individuals.”188
The supreme court held that malice does not require proof that
the defendant’s actions were targeted at a particular individual
due to the doctrine of implied malice.189 Implied malice is when a
“defendant intentionally acts, even though he knows his actions
are wrong and so inherently dangerous that they could result in
death.”190 The court explained that it is “patently obvious that firing multiple shots from a handgun in the middle of a populous city”
is the definition of implied malice.191
183. Id. at __ 839 S.E.2d at 910 (citing Reed v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 594, 596–98, 391
S.E.2d 75, 76–77 (1990)).
184. Id. at __, 839 S.E.2d at 910 (quoting Reed, 239 Va. at 597–98, 391 S.E.2d at 77).
185. Id. at __, 839 S.E.2d at 910 (quoting Reed, 239 Va. at 597–98, 391 S.E.2d at 77).
186. 298 Va. 251, 253–55, 835 S.E.2d 902, 903–04 (2019).
187. Id. at 255, 835 S.E.2d at 903–04.
188. Id. at 255, 835 S.E.2d at 904.
189. Id. at 256–58, 835 S.E.2d at 904–06.
190. Id. at 256, 835 S.E.2d at 904–05.
191. Id. at 258, 835 S.E.2d at 905.
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In Flanders v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
was asked to determine whether felony hit and run, in violation of
Virginia Code section 46.2-894, could serve as a predicate offense
for a felony homicide conviction, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-33.192 At common law, felony murder only occurs “when
an actor unintentionally kill[s] another person during the commission of a dangerous or violent felony,”193 but, “the plain language of
the felony-homicide statute goes beyond the common-law understanding of felony murder by permitting murder convictions based
on nonviolent predicate felonies.”194
In holding felony hit and run may serve as the predicate offense
for felony murder, the supreme court explained that those offenses
previously determined to include the requisite imputed malice necessary for a felony murder conviction “involve some intentional
course of wrongful conduct dangerous to human life.”195 Furthermore, the doctrine of res gestae requires that there be a “time,
place, and causal connection” between the felony committed and
the killing, which should be determined on a case-by-case basis.196
The evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of both aggravated malicious wounding and murder in Ellis v. Commonwealth, as multiple pieces of evidence showed that the victim survived the defendant’s initial attack for some temporal period, even
though she later died, and death is certainly a “permanent” injury
as required by the statute.197
B. Identity Theft
In Taylor v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether a person “can commit attempted identity theft under Code § 18.2-186.3 when using his or her own identifying information to obtain money.”198 The defendant in Taylor “stole a check,
made it payable to herself of a certain amount, forged the account

192.
193.

298 Va. 345, 350, 838 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2020).
Id. at 354, 838 S.E.2d at 56 (citing JOHN L. COSTELLO, VIRGINIA CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 3.4[3] (4th ed. 2008)).
194. Id. at 355, 838 S.E.2d at 57.
195. Id. at 357–59, 838 S.E.2d at 58–59, 63.
196. Id. at 359–60, 838 S.E.2d at 59–60.
197. 70 Va. App. 385, 392–93, 827 S.E.2d 786, 789–90 (2019).
198. 298 Va. 336, 338, 837 S.E.2d 674, 675 (2020).
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owner’s signature and, using her own driver’s license as identification, presented it to a bank teller for cash, but left the bank before
completing the transaction.”199 Under the plain language of the
statute, Taylor’s actions constitute identity theft because she used
the victim’s identifying information—the victim’s name and bank
account number—with the intent to defraud in an attempt to obtain money.200
C. Possession of a Cellular Device by a Prisoner
In Jordan v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of
possession of a cellular telephone by a prisoner, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-431.1(B).201 Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient because the Commonwealth only offered evidence that the device appeared to be a cell phone and failed to
prove the character of the device.202 Multiple officers testified that
the item recovered in the prison was a cell phone but none of them
actually activated the device.203
The court of appeals explained that the statute does not require
proof of operability or actual functionality.204 It further held that
courts can rely on the testimony of officers identifying the device
as a cell phone without expert testimony.205
D. Obstruction of Justice
In Maldonado v. Commonwealth, the defendant’s conviction for
obstruction of justice was reversed where he lied to police during a
consensual encounter that a subject the police were looking for was
not in his home and refused entry of the officers into the home.206
As the officers did not have a warrant, did not seize Maldonado,
and never gave Maldonado a lawful command, Maldonado’s conduct did not “oppose, impede, or resist” the officer’s investigative

199. Id. at 338, 837 S.E.2d at 675.
200. Id. at 341–43, 837 S.E.2d at 677.
201. 72 Va. App. 1, 8, 840 S.E.2d 568, 571 (2020).
202. Id. at 6, 840 S.E.2d at 570.
203. Id. at 4, 840 S.E.2d at 569.
204. Id. at 6, 8, 840 S.E.2d at 570–71.
205. Id. at 8, 840 S.E.2d at 571.
206. 70 Va. App. 554, 560, 569–70, 829 S.E.2d 570, 572–73, 577–78 (2019).
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efforts, but instead merely resulted in a forty-minute delay in the
officers locating the subject.207
E. Sexual Offenders
In Young v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was required to register under the Crimes Against Minors Registry Act, Virginia Code sections 9.1-900 through -923 (“the
Act”).208 The Act requires that people convicted of one or more specific offenses on or after July 1, 1994 register and reregister. It also
requires people who were convicted before July 1, 1994, who are
serving a sentence of confinement or under community supervision
on or after July 1, 1994, to register and reregister.209 The evidence
established that Young pled guilty in 2014 for failing to reregister,
the Virginia Criminal Information Network reflected that he was
incarcerated for committing a sex crime, and he made statements
and admissions in his reregistration form that constituted additional circumstantial evidence that he was required to reregister
under the Act and failed to do so.210
F. Sexual Crimes
In Robinson v. Commonwealth, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he committed sexual battery, in
violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-67.4—specifically that he
used the requisite “force sufficient to overcome the victim’s will.”211
The Court of Appeals of Virginia initially reversed Robinson’s conviction, but upon a rehearing en banc, found that the trial court did
not err in finding sufficient evidence and affirmed Robinson’s conviction.212 The court determined that Robinson used the requisite
force because he twisted the victim’s breasts “as hard as he could”
for approximately a minute.213 With this decision, the court of ap-

207. Id. at 569–70, 829 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App.
428, 431, 505 S.E.2d 388, 390 (1998)).
208. 70 Va. App. 646, 650, 830 S.E.2d 68, 70 (2019).
209. Id. at 654, 830 S.E.2d at 72.
210. Id. at 659–62, 830 S.E.2d at 74–76.
211. 70 Va. App. 509, 513, 828 S.E.2d 269, 271 (2019).
212. Id. at 511, 828 S.E.2d at 270.
213. Id. at 517, 828 S.E.2d at 273.
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peals pronounced that it was overruling Johnson v. Commonwealth.214 In “wrongly decid[ing]” Johnson, the court declared that
it had “misinterpreted the plain language of the statute, failed to
apply the appropriate appellate standard of review giving due deference to the fact finder, and incorrectly found on appeal a lack of
force.”215
In Stoltz v. Commonwealth, Stoltz was convicted of using a computer to solicit a minor, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2374.3(C).216 He had engaged in e-mail conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a thirteen-year-old girl.217 The
statute prohibits adults from using a computer to solicit “any person he knows or has reason to believe is a child younger than 15
years of age” to engage in various sex acts.218 On appeal, he argued
that the phrase “reason to believe” in the statute was unconstitutionally vague, and that the statute was overbroad in violation of
the First Amendment.219
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed.220 As to the vagueness
challenge, the court determined that the phrase “knows or has reason to believe” is not ambiguous.221 The supreme court reasoned
that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand the phrase
and noted the phrase’s presence in other statutes.222 Moreover, the
evidence clearly demonstrated that Stoltz had reason to believe
that he was communicating with someone he believed to be under
the age of fifteen.223 The undercover officer stated that she was
thirteen and corrected Stoltz when he said she was twenty-three.224
Additionally, the supreme court rejected Stoltz’s overbreadth challenge, ruling that the statute did not sweep in substantial amounts

214. Id. at 516, 828 S.E.2d at 272 (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 529, 365
S.E.2d 237 (1988)).
215. Id. at 517, 828 S.E.2d at 273.
216. 297 Va. 529, 529, 831 S.E.2d 164, 166 (2019).
217. Id. at 529–32, 831 S.E.2d at 166–68.
218. VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.3(C) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
219. Stoltz, 297 Va. at 533, 831 S.E.2d at 168 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.3(C)
(Repl. Vol. 2014)).
220. Id. at 534, 831 S.E.2d at 169.
221. Id. at 535, 831 S.E.2d at 170.
222. Id. at 535–36 & nn.3–4, 831 S.E.2d at 170 & nn.3–4.
223. Id. at 536–37, 831 S.E.2d at 170–71.
224. Id. at 536, 831 S.E.2d at 170.
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of protected speech.225 Indeed, the statute punishes conduct, not
speech.226 Accordingly, the court affirmed Stoltz’s conviction.227
In Ele v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia considered whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Ele of two
counts of producing child pornography, aggravated sexual battery,
and taking indecent liberties with a child following the seizure of
pictures and videos from his home.228 Ele took pictures and videos
of himself masturbating near a sleeping nine-year-old girl, a friend
of his daughter’s.229 Ele filmed himself placing his penis on the
girl’s face and foot and ejaculating onto her hair and leg.230 Ele
challenged two of his convictions on appeal: one of the production
of child pornography convictions and taking indecent liberties with
a child.231
Ele argued that he could not be convicted of one count of the production of child pornography because in one set of images, he did
not film a nude child, which he believed the statute required.232
Virginia Code section 18.2-374.1(B)(2) prohibits the production of
child pornography, which is defined as “sexually explicit visual material which utilizes or has as a subject an identifiable minor.”233
The statute further defines “sexually explicit visual material” as “a
picture, photograph . . . motion picture film, digital image . . . or
[other] similar representation which depicts . . . a lewd exhibition
of nudity . . . or sexual excitement, sexual conduct, or sadomasochistic abuse… .”234 The court of appeals noted that the girl was
clothed in one set of images, but the court concluded that the statute does not require the child to be nude.235 The images clearly depicted Ele’s nude genitals as he filmed himself masturbating and
ejaculating onto the child, which satisfied the statute.236
Additionally, Ele argued that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of indecent liberties because the child was asleep and
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 538, 831 S.E.2d at 171.
Id. at 538, 831 S.E.2d at 171.
Id. at 538, 831 S.E.2d at 171.
70 Va. App. 543, 546–47, 829 S.E.2d 564, 566 (2019).
Id. at 547, 829 S.E.2d at 566.
Id. at 547, 829 S.E.2d at 566.
Id. at 546, 829 S.E.2d at 566.
Id. at 548–49, 829 S.E.2d at 566–67.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1(A)–(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 18.2-374.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Ele, 70 Va. App. at 549–51, 829 S.E.2d at 567–68.
Id. at 550–52, 829 S.E.2d at 568–69.
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never saw Ele’s genitals.237 The court distinguished between indecent exposure and indecent liberties and noted that there was a
reasonable probability that the child could have awoken to see
Ele’s genitals.238 As such, the court of appeals affirmed Ele’s convictions.239
G. Fraud
In Caldwell v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether Virginia Code section 18.2-188 requires specific intent.240 The defendant may or may not have been specifically
invited to breakfast at a hotel by a guest of the hotel who received
a complimentary breakfast.241 After breakfast, a member of the hotel staff approached Caldwell and asked that she pay eight dollars
for the breakfast; she refused and argued with the hotel staff before
leaving without paying.242 She was indicted and convicted of violating Virginia Code section 18.2-188(2), which makes it unlawful
for anyone to obtain food with the intent to defraud the owner.243
On appeal, Caldwell argued that Virginia Code section 18.2-188
is a specific intent statute and requires evidence showing that she
had the intent to defraud the innkeeper at the time she obtained
the food.244 The supreme court agreed, determining that the statute was unambiguous.245 The court reasoned that the statute criminalizes an act combined with the intent to defraud—in this case
obtaining food combined with the intent to defraud.246 The court
reversed Caldwell’s conviction, ruling that there was a reasonable
doubt as to her intent to defraud when she obtained the food.247
In Jefferson v. Commonwealth, Jefferson was indicted for two
counts of felony welfare fraud.248 In applying for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) benefits, Jefferson neglected
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 552, 829 S.E.2d at 569.
Id. at 552–54, 829 S.E.2d at 569.
Id. at 554, 829 S.E.2d at 570.
__ Va. __, __, 840 S.E.2d 343, 346–47 (2020).
Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 345.
Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 345.
Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 344.
Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 346–47.
Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 348.
Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 348.
Id. at __, 840 S.E.2d at 348.
298 Va. 1, 4, 833 S.E.2d 462, 463 (2019).
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to include income she earned from a part-time job.249 Jefferson admitted to working at the part-time job, stating that she did not include the income in the application because she did not know how
long she would work there, and that she thought she did not need
to report the income if it was below a certain amount.250 The county
Department of Social Services (the “Department”) calculated that
Jefferson received some $3400 in SNAP benefits that she should
not have received.251 The Department admitted, however, that this
calculation was not based on the difference between what Jefferson
actually received and what she would have received had she reported the part-time income.252
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that there was sufficient evidence that Jefferson had received SNAP benefits in excess
of $200 for each period in the indictment, meaning that there was
sufficient evidence of felony welfare fraud.253 The court, however,
disagreed with the Department’s calculation as to the amount of
benefits Jefferson fraudulently received.254 The court determined
that the Department should calculate the amount as the difference
between what she actually received and the amount she should
have received had she reported the part-time income.255 Additionally, the court stated that the Department should have included
the deductions that Jefferson was entitled to, like a housing deduction that was not included in certain months.256 Furthermore, the
court determined that any error in limiting Jefferson’s cross examination of a Department expert was harmless because the evidence
admitted clearly demonstrated that Jefferson met the threshold for
felony welfare fraud.257
H. Destruction of Property
To meet the $1000 value threshold for felony destruction of property, the Supreme Court of Virginia held in Spratley v. Commonwealth that the Commonwealth is not required to show the “fair
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 4–5, 833 S.E.2d at 463–64.
Id. at 5, 833 S.E.2d at 464.
Id. at 5–6, 833 S.E.2d at 464–65.
Id. at 7–9, 833 S.E.2d at 465–66.
Id. at 12–13, 833 S.E.2d at 467–68.
Id. at 13, 833 S.E.2d at 468.
Id. at 12, 833 S.E.2d at 467–68.
Id. at 12, 833 S.E.2d at 468.
Id. at 12–13, 833 S.E.2d at 468.
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market value” of the destroyed property right before its destruction
as evidenced by its original purchase price, age, or depreciation,
but rather, as the statute states, the “fair market replacement
value” of the property.258
Thus, the circuit court did not err in determining that the evidence was sufficient to show that the “fair market replacement
value” of the destroyed property, a grocery counter scale, was over
$1000 when the evidence showed that the model of the destroyed
scale was no longer being manufactured and the scale that replaced the destroyed scale cost upwards of $3000, performed the
same functions, and had the same design and layout.259
I. Failure to Stop at the Scene of an Accident
In Butcher v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Butcher’s conviction for misdemeanor failure to stop at the
scene of an accident, a violation of the “hit-and-run” statute.260 In
a published opinion, the Court of Appeals of Virginia had affirmed
the conviction, determining that there was sufficient evidence that
Butcher failed to satisfy either of the two post-accident reporting
requirements in the statute.261 The court of appeals then went on
to hold sua sponte that a driver needed to satisfy either of the postaccident reporting requirements, even though Butcher and the
Commonwealth agreed that he had to satisfy both requirements.262
The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals as to the
sufficiency of the evidence.263 The supreme court, however, vacated
the portion of the holding concerning the post-accident reporting
requirements pursuant to the logic of judicial restraint.264 Neither
party had sought an answer from the court of appeals as to whether
the post-accident reporting requirements were conjunctive or disjunctive.265 The supreme court determined that Butcher had failed

258. 298 Va. 187, 194–96, 836 S.E.2d 385, 389–90 (2019).
259. Id. at 195–96, 836 S.E.2d at 389–90.
260. __ Va. __, __, 838 S.E.2d 538, 539 (2020) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-894 (Repl.
Vol. 2017)).
261. Id. at __, 838 S.E.2d at 539.
262. Id. at __, 838 S.E.2d at 539.
263. Id. at __, 838 S.E.2d at 539.
264. Id. at __, 838 S.E.2d at 539–40.
265. Id. at __, 838 S.E.2d at 539.
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to present the issue to the court, and also that it was “logically unnecessary” for that court to resolve an undisputed issue.266
J. Driving on a Revoked License
The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Yoder v. Commonwealth
that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant had
actual notice that her license was revoked as required by Virginia
Code section 18.2-272(A), as she had been present in court for two
prior guilty pleas for driving on a revoked license.267 Further, she
made no excuse for not having a driver’s license during arrest and
possessed instead an ID card which could not be simultaneously
possessed with a driver’s license.268 Virginia Code section 18.2272(A) does not mandate any particular form or degree of specificity for actual notice; accordingly, the notice shown here was sufficient.269
The supreme court further stated that this case is distinguishable from a suspension under Virginia Code section 46.2-301(B),
where, after a suspension period ends, the driver is in an “odd legal
purgatory” where he is neither driving on a revoked license nor
driving on a valid license, but rather is merely driving without a
valid license.270 As Yoder’s revocation period was still in effect
when she was arrested, she was not in this “purgatory,” thus the
trial court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient.271
K. Conspiracy
In Smallwood v. Commonwealth, the defendant appealed his
conviction of three counts of conspiracy to obtain money by false
pretenses and argued on appeal (1) that convicting him of multiple
conspiracies violated his Fifth Amendment rights and (2) that the
court erred in convicting him of multiple conspiracies.272 The Court

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at __, 838 S.E.2d at 539–40.
298 Va. 180, 183–84, 835 S.E.2d 897, 900 (2019).
Id. at 183–84, 835 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 182–83, 835 S.E.2d at 899–900.
Id. at 184–85, 835 S.E.2d at 900–01.
Id. at 184–85, 835 S.E.2d at 900–01.
72 Va. App. 119, 122–23, 841 S.E.2d 881, 882 (2020).
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of Appeals of Virginia determined that Smallwood had failed to
preserve his first argument.273
As to his second argument, the court of appeals agreed that the
evidence demonstrated that Smallwood was involved in one conspiracy to defraud three people—a Ponzi scheme.274 The court of
appeals distinguished this case from Cartwright v. Commonwealth, in which Cartwright was convicted of multiple conspiracies
for attempting to commit multiple, different crimes.275 The court
reversed Smallwood’s convictions and concluded that the number
of convictions should depend on the number of agreements, which
was one in this case.276
III. LEGISLATION
A. Venue
The General Assembly expanded the potential venues for a prosecution of a violation of a protective order to the jurisdiction where
the protective order was issued or in any county or city where any
act constituting the violation of the protective order occurred.277
Previously, venue for child pornography offenses lay where the
act occurred or where any material associated with the violation
was “produced, reproduced, found, stored, or possessed.”278 The
General Assembly added where the defendant resides to that
list.279
The 2020 General Assembly established default venue in the
City of Richmond for a perpetrator charged with threatening or
harassing by computer certain government officials, including but
not limited to the Governor, Attorney General, member of the General Assembly, any justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia, or any

273. Id. at 127, 841 S.E.2d at 884–85.
274. Id. at 130, 841 S.E.2d at 886.
275. Id. at 130, 841 S.E.2d at 886 (citing Cartwright v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 368, 288
S.E.2d 491 (1982)).
276. Id. at 130–31, 841 S.E.2d at 886.
277. Act of Mar. 27, 2020, ch. 487, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16.1-253.2, 18.2-60.4 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
278. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-374.1(E), -374.1:1(G) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
279. Act of Mar. 27, 2020, ch. 489, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-374.1, -374.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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judge of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, when the venue cannot
be otherwise established.280
The General Assembly also established default venue in the City
of Richmond for a perpetrator charged with threatening to bomb or
damage a building or means of transportation owned by the Commonwealth and located within the Capitol District, when venue
cannot be otherwise established.281 The General Assembly clarified
that any person who is under fifteen years old, not just persons the
age of fifteen, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor should they
threaten to bomb or damage a building or means of transportation.282
B. Sex Offenses
The legislature repealed the crime of fornication—sexual intercourse by an unmarried person.283
The General Assembly added the act of touching the unclothed
genitals or anus of another with the intent to sexually arouse or
gratify for money or other equivalent to the definition of prostitution.284
The legislature added to the definition of sexual battery.285 Anyone who is or purports to be a massage therapist, healer, or physical therapist, who sexually abuses another and commits an act not
recognized as a form of treatment in the profession and without the
express consent of the patient, commits a sexual battery.286
C. Bail
The General Assembly eliminated the provision prohibiting a judicial officer from admitting to bail any person who is charged with
280. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 1002, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-60, -60.1, -152.7:1, -430 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
281. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-83 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
282. Id. at __.
283. Act of Mar. 4, 2020, ch. 122, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 4.1-225, 15.2-907, -1724, 17.1-275.13, 18.2-67.5:2, -67.9, -346, -366 (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
284. Act of Apr. 2, 2020, ch. 595, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-346, -348, -356 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
285. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 1003, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
286. Id. at __.
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an offense giving rise to a rebuttable presumption against bail
without the concurrence of the Commonwealth.287 Notice is no
longer required to be provided to the attorney for the Commonwealth.288
D. Protective Orders
The General Assembly authorized a court to issue a protective
order upon convicting a defendant for an act of violence and after
the request of the victim or the Commonwealth on behalf of the
victim.289 The General Assembly provided that the duration of such
protective order can be for any reasonable period of time, including
the lifetime of the defendant, that the court deems necessary to
protect the health and safety of the victim.290 The bill provides that
a violation of a protective order issued upon a conviction for an act
of violence is punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor.291
E. Traffic Offenses/Licensure
The General Assembly repealed Virginia Code sections 18.2259.1, 46.2-320.2, 46.2-390.1, 46.2-416.1, and 53.1-127.4, which
provide for the suspension of drivers’ licenses upon conviction for a
drug offense, for non-payment of court or jail fees, or for theft of
motor fuel.292
The legislature removed portions of the Virginia Code allowing
for the suspension of drivers’ licenses for the failure to pay court
costs or fines.293 Additionally, the legislature added a new section,
46.2-808.2, which provides for a fine of no more than $500 for any

287. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 999, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-120 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
288. Id. at __.
289. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 1005, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-152.10 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
290. Id. at __.
291. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.4 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
292. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 740, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-259.1, 46.2-320.2, -390.1, -416.1, 53.1-127.4 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
293. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 964, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19.2-258.1, 19.2-354, 33.2-503, 46.2-203.1, -301, -361, -383, -391.1, -416, -808.2,
-819.1, -819.3, -819.3:1, -819.5, -940, -1200.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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moving violation within a designated highway safety corridor if the
offense is a traffic violation, or $200 for a criminal offense.294
The legislature added a new section to Virginia Code section
18.2-268.3.295 For a first offense for refusal to provide a breath test
where a person’s license has been suspended, thirty days after the
date of conviction, the defendant may petition the court for a restricted license.296 The new code section requires, among other
things, that if the court grants the defendant a restricted license,
the defendant must install an ignition interlock system on any vehicle owned or registered by him or her and also complete an alcohol safety action program.297 Furthermore, such a restricted license
will not entitle the defendant to operate a commercial vehicle.298
The General Assembly prohibited the use of any handheld personal communications device while driving, with exceptions for
emergency vehicles, parked or stopped vehicles, reporting an emergency, amateur radios, or a Department of Transportation vehicle
during traffic management services.299 This legislation will be effective January 1, 2021.300
The General Assembly retained one definition of reckless driving
as twenty miles per hour over the posted speed limit.301 The other
definition of reckless driving—over eighty miles per hour—is
amended to over eighty-five.302 The legislation also includes an additional $100 fine for anyone who drives over eighty miles per hour
but under eighty-six on any highway with a posted speed limit of
sixty-five miles per hour.303

294. Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-808.2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
295. Act of Mar. 12, 2020, ch. 341, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-268.3, 46.2-391.2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
296. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.3 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
297. Id. at __.
298. Id. at __.
299. Act of Mar. 10, 2020, ch. 250, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-868 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
300. Id. at __.
301. Act of Mar. 25, 2020, ch. 444, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 46.2-862, -878.3 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
302. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-862 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
303. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-878.3 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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F. Drug and Alcohol Offenses
The General Assembly prohibited the sale to persons under age
twenty-one of hemp products intended for smoking.304
The General Assembly decriminalized simple marijuana possession and provided a civil penalty of no more than $25.305 The previous law imposed a maximum fine of $500 and a maximum thirtyday jail sentence for a first offense, and subsequent offenses were
a Class 1 misdemeanor.306 The law now provides that any violation
of simple possession of marijuana may be charged by a summons
in the same form as the uniform summons for motor vehicle law
violations and that no court costs shall be assessed for such violations.307
The law also provides that a person’s criminal history record information shall not include records of any charges or judgments for
such violations and records of such charges or judgments shall not
be reported to the Central Criminal Records Exchange.308
Also, the law states that the procedure for appeal and trial of
any violation of simple possession of marijuana shall be the same
as provided by law for misdemeanors, and that if requested by either party on appeal to the circuit court, trial by jury shall be provided and the Commonwealth shall be required to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.309
Additionally, the law provides that the suspended sentence/substance abuse screening provisions and driver’s license suspension
provisions apply only to criminal violations or to civil violations by
a juvenile.310
The law defines “marijuana” to include hashish oil and creates a
rebuttable presumption that a person who possesses no more than
one ounce of marijuana possesses it for personal use.311

304. Act of Mar. 23, 2020, ch. 406, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371.2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
305. Act of May 21, 2020, ch. 1285, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-250.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
306. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250.1 (Cum. Supp. 2019).
307. Ch. 1285, 2020 Va. Acts at __.
308. Id. at __.
309. Id. at __.
310. Id. at __.
311. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-247 to -248.1. (Cum. Supp.
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The law also (1) makes records relating to the arrest, criminal
charge, or conviction of possession of marijuana not open to public
inspection and disclosure, except in certain circumstances; (2) prohibits employers and educational institutions from requiring an
applicant for employment or admission to disclose information related to such arrest, criminal charge, or conviction; and (3) prohibits agencies, officials, and employees of the state and local governments from requiring an applicant for a license, permit,
registration, or governmental service to disclose information concerning such arrest, criminal charge, or conviction.312
Also, the law allows a person charged with a civil offense who is
acquitted, a nolle prosequi is taken, or the charge is otherwise dismissed to file a petition requesting expungement of the police records and court records related to the charge.313
Finally, the law requires the Secretaries of Agriculture and Forestry, Finance, Health and Human Resources, and Public Safety
and Homeland Security to convene a work group to study the impact on the Commonwealth of legalizing the sale and personal use
of marijuana and report the recommendations of the work group to
the General Assembly and the Governor by November 30, 2020.314
The Board of Pharmacy added a list of chemicals to Schedule I
of the Drug Control Act in an expedited regulatory process.315 A
substance added via this process is removed from the schedule after eighteen months unless a general law is enacted adding the
substance to the schedule.316
The General Assembly provided that no individual shall be subject to arrest or prosecution for the unlawful purchase, possession,
or consumption of alcohol, possession of a controlled substance,
possession of marijuana, intoxication in public, or possession of
controlled paraphernalia if (1) such individual (a) seeks or obtains
emergency medical attention for himself, if he is experiencing an
overdose, or for another individual, if such other individual is ex-

2020)).
312. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389.3 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
313. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
314. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3446 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
315. Act of Mar. 3, 2020, ch. 101, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-3440 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
316. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3443 (Repl. Vol. 2019).
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periencing an overdose, or (b) is experiencing an overdose and another individual seeks or obtains emergency medical attention for
him; (2) such individual remains at the scene of the overdose or at
any location to which he or the individual requiring emergency
medical attention has been transported; (3) such individual identifies himself to the law-enforcement officer who responds; and (4)
the evidence for a prosecution of one of the enumerated offenses
would have been obtained only as a result of an individual seeking
or obtaining emergency medical attention.317 The law also provides
that no law-enforcement officer acting in a good faith shall be found
liable for false arrest if it is later determined that the person arrested was immune from prosecution.318
Previously the law provided an affirmative defense to such offenses only when an individual sought or obtained emergency medical attention for himself, if he was experiencing an overdose, or for
another individual, if such other individual was experiencing an
overdose.319
G. Forfeiture
The General Assembly required that any action for the forfeiture
of property used in connection with the commission of a crime be
stayed until the person whose property is the subject of the forfeiture action has been found guilty of the crime which authorized the
forfeiture.320 However, the property may be forfeited even if no
finding of guilt is made if the forfeiture is ordered by a court pursuant to a plea agreement or the owner has not submitted a written
demand for the return of the property within twenty-one days from
the date the stay terminates.321
H. Firearms
The General Assembly now requires a background check for any
firearm sale and has directed the Department of State Police (“the

317. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 1016, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-251.03 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
318. Id. at __.
319. VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-251.03 (Repl. Vol. 2014).
320. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 1000, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-386.1. (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
321. Id. at __.

DUNN-PIRIO-MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

104

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

11/29/2020 9:53 PM

[Vol. 55:67

Department”) to establish a process for transferors to obtain such
a background check from licensed firearms dealers.322 A person
who sells a firearm to another person without obtaining the required background check is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.323 The
law also provides that a purchaser who receives a firearm from another person without obtaining the required background check is
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.324 The law further removes the
provision that makes background checks of prospective purchasers
or transferees at firearms shows voluntary.325 The law also provides that the Department shall have three business days to complete a background check before a firearm may be transferred.326
The legislature enacted a new law, which provides that any person who recklessly leaves a loaded, unsecured firearm in such a
manner as to endanger the life or limb of any person under the age
of fourteen is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.327 Previously, the
law provided that any person who recklessly left a loaded, unsecured firearm in such a manner as to endanger the life or limb of
any child under the age of fourteen was guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.328
I. Hate Crimes
The legislature added the following to the list of crimes that a
multi-jurisdictional grand jury may investigate: (1) simple assault
or assault and battery where the victim was intentionally selected
because of his race, religious conviction, gender, disability, gender
identity, sexual orientation, color, or national origin; (2) entering
the property of another for purposes of damaging such property or
its contents or interfering with the rights of the owner, user, or
occupant where such property was intentionally selected because
of the race, religious conviction, gender, disability, gender identity,

322. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1112, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-308.2:5 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
323. Id. at __.
324. Id. at __.
325. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-4201.2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
326. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
327. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 742, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-56.2. (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
328. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-56.2 (Repl. Vol. 2014).
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sexual orientation, color, or national origin of the owner, user, or
occupant; and (3) various offenses that tend to cause violence.329
The 2020 General Assembly expanded those groups which qualify as the target of a “hate crime,” as it relates to assault, assault
and battery (Virginia Code section 18.2-57), and unlawful entry
(Virginia Code section 18.2-121), to include gender, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, and national origin.330 Those
groups previously were limited to individuals targeted due to their
race, religion, or ethnic origin.331 A definition of “disability” was
added to the statute, defining it as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of a person’s major life
activities.”332
The mandatory minimum sentence was increased from thirty
days to six months for any violation of Virginia Code sections 18.257 or 18.2-121, where the victim of the offense belongs to any of
those eight protected groups.333
The General Assembly added gender, disability, gender identity,
sexual orientation, and national origin as qualifying protected
groups, and required that all hate crimes be reported to the Department of State Police by all state, county, and municipal law
enforcement agencies.334
J. Juveniles
The General Assembly enacted a law now requiring that prior to
the custodial interrogation of a child who has been arrested by a
law-enforcement officer for a criminal violation, the child’s parent,
guardian, or legal custodian be notified of the child’s arrest, and

329. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 747, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-215.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
330. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-57, -121 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
331. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-57, -121 (Repl. Vol. 2014).
332. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 746, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-57, -121 (Cum. Supp. 2020)); Act of Apr. 11, 2020, ch. 1171, 2020 Va. Acts __,
__ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-57, -121 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
333. Ch. 746, 2020 Va. Acts at __; Ch. 1171, 2020 Va. Acts at __.
334. Act of Mar. 4, 2020, ch. 124, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 52-8.5 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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the child must have contact with his parent, guardian, or legal custodian.335 Such notification and contact “may be in person, electronically, by telephone, or by video conference.”336 However, notification and contact prior to a custodial interrogation is not
required if the “parent, guardian, or legal custodian is a codefendant in the alleged offense;” the “parent, guardian, or legal custodian has been arrested for, has been charged with, or is being investigated for a crime against the child;” the person cannot
reasonably be located or refuses contact with the child; or “the lawenforcement officer conducting the custodial interrogation reasonably believes the information sought is necessary to protect life,
limb, or property from an imminent danger and the law-enforcement officer’s questions are limited to those that are reasonably
necessary to obtain that information.”337
The legislature increased the statute of limitations for certain
misdemeanor violations against children from one year after the
child victim reaches majority to five years after majority where the
offender is an adult and more than three years older than the victim.338
The General Assembly altered the procedure for bringing murder charges against defendants between the ages of fourteen and
sixteen. Before July 1, 2020, if a juvenile fourteen years of age or
older was charged with murder, the juvenile court conducted a preliminary hearing.339 The legislation amends Virginia Code section
16.1-269.1 so that if the juvenile is charged with murder and is
between fourteen and sixteen years of age, the juvenile court may
hold a transfer hearing upon motion of the Commonwealth.340 For
juveniles sixteen years of age or older, the juvenile court conducts
a preliminary hearing.341 The legislation also requires the attorney
for the Commonwealth to submit a request to the director of court
services to complete a report described in Virginia Code section

335. Act of Mar. 27, 2020, ch. 480, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-247.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
336. Id. at __.
337. Id. at __.
338. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1122, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-8 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
339. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
340. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 987, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
341. Id. at __.
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16.1-269.2.342 Once the report is complete, the attorney for the
Commonwealth must then provide notice of intent to proceed with
a preliminary hearing.343
Previously, it was illegal to smoke in a vehicle containing a child
younger than eight years of age.344 The legislature raised the age
of the child to fifteen.345
The General Assembly provided courts with the discretion to depart from any mandatory minimum sentence if a juvenile is convicted of a felony.346 Additionally, the court may “suspend any portion of an otherwise applicable sentence.”347 Furthermore, where a
juvenile is sentenced as an adult, in addition to other factors, the
court shall consider “(i) the juvenile’s exposure to adverse childhood experiences, early childhood trauma, or any child welfare
agency and (ii) the differences between juvenile and adult offenders.”348
K. Sentencing
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.2303.01 by providing sentencing courts with the discretion to reduce
the sentence of a defendant who provided “assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person” for grand larceny of a firearm.349
The General Assembly also amended sentencing procedures for
defendants convicted of drug offenses.350

342. Id. at __.
343. Id. at __.
344. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-810.1 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
345. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 972, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.2-810.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
346. Act of Mar. 23, 2020, ch. 396, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-272 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
347. Id. at __.
348. Id. at __.
349. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 765, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-303.01 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
350. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 740, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-251 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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L. Voir Dire
The 2020 General Assembly passed a law allowing the court and
counsel to ask potential jurors questions about whether they “can
sit impartially in either the guilt or sentencing phase” and inform
potential jurors of the potential sentencing range.351
M. Custodial Interrogations
The General Assembly enacted a new provision, which requires
that any law-enforcement officer shall, if practicable, make an audiovisual recording of the entirety of any custodial interrogation of
a person conducted in a place of detention.352 The law provides that
if an audiovisual recording is unable to be made, the law-enforcement officer shall make an audio recording of the entirety of the
custodial interrogation.353 The law also provides that the failure of
a law-enforcement officer to make such a recording shall not affect
the admissibility of the statements made during the custodial interrogation, but the court or jury may consider such failure in determining the weight given to such evidence.354
N. Discovery
The 2020 General Assembly passed several laws altering discovery practice in criminal matters.355 It established new requirements and procedures for discovery: a party requesting discovery
must request that the other party voluntarily comply with the discovery request before filing a motion with the court; if the party
receives an unsatisfactory response, the requesting party may file
a motion for discovery with the court.356 The law details the timing

351. Act of Mar. 4, 2020, ch. 157, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-262.01 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
352. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1126, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-390.04 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
353. Id. at __.
354. Id. at __.
355. Act of Apr. 11, 2020, ch. 1167, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19.2-389, -264.6 to -264.14 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
356. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.7 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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requirements for discovery production and mechanisms for redacting personal identifying information and creates a procedure for
either party to move the court to enter a protection order.357
Additionally, all criminal attorneys who are active members of
the Virginia State Bar may issue subpoenas duces tecum.358
O. Journalist Privilege
The General Assembly enacted legislation protecting journalists
from being forced by the Commonwealth to disclose protected information unless the court finds the protected information is necessary to prove a material issue, the “information is not obtainable
from any alternative source,” the Commonwealth exhausted all
reasonable methods for obtaining the information, and “there is an
overriding public interest in the disclosure of the protected information.”359 Any information obtained in violation of this statute is
inadmissible.360
P. Service
Clerk’s offices must accept a copy of the original proof of service
as if it were an original proof of service if the proponent provides a
statement that the copy is a true copy of the original.361
Q. Appeal of Right in General District Court
The General Assembly enacted a law providing for an appeal of
right to a court of record from a district court of any order entered
that alters, amends, overturns, or vacates a prior final order.362

357. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.7, -264.9, -264.12 (Cum.
Supp. 2020)).
358. Act of Apr. 7, 2020, ch. 771, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-10.4 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
359. Act of Apr. 6, 2020, ch. 650, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-271.5 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
360. Id. at __.
361. Act of Mar. 4, 2020, ch. 158, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-325 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
362. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1048, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-106 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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R. Ex Parte Requests for Expert Assistance
The General Assembly enacted legislation providing that indigent defendants charged with felonies or Class 1 misdemeanors
may move the court “to designate another judge in the same circuit
to hear an ex parte request for appointment of a qualified expert to
assist” the defense.363 The court is required to authorize the defense to obtain expert assistance if the defense shows that the assistance would materially assist the defendant and that the denial
of such services would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.364
S. Miscellaneous Crimes
Under new legislation, it is a Class 1 misdemeanor to maliciously send an electronically transmitted communication containing a false representation, with the intent to cause another person
to spend money, causing the person to spend money.365
The 2020 General Assembly increased the threshold amount
from $500 to $1000 for money taken or the value of goods taken
sufficient for a grand larceny.366 The General Assembly also increased the threshold by the same amount for a host of other larceny and property crimes, including but not limited to conspiracy
to commit larceny, burning or destroying a building or personal
property, petit larceny, unauthorized use of a vehicle, concealment,
and credit card fraud.367
The 2020 General Assembly enhanced the penalty for unauthorized use of an electronic tracking device, increasing its classification from a Class 3 misdemeanor to a Class 1 misdemeanor.368

363. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1124, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-266.4 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
364. Id. at __.
365. Act of Apr. 11, 2020, ch. 1178, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-152.7:2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
366. Act of Mar. 3, 2020, ch. 89, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-95 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
367. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-23, -80, -81, -96, -96.1, -97,
-102, -103, -108.01, -145.1, -150, -152.3, -162, -181, -181.1, -182, -186, -186.3, -187.1, -188,
-195, -195.2, -197, -340.37, 19.2-289, -386.16 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
368. Act of Mar. 4, 2020, ch. 140, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-60.5 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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The 2020 General Assembly repealed the crime of profane
swearing in public, which was punishable as a Class 4 misdemeanor.369
The 2020 General Assembly enacted legislation making brandishing a firearm, air- or gas-operated weapon or object similar in
appearance, pursuant to Virginia Code section 18.2-282, a prohibited paramilitary activity, if the action is committed while assembled with one or more persons and for the purpose of intimidating
any person or group.370 The General Assembly criminalizes this
conduct as a Class 5 felony.371
The 2020 General Assembly expanded the crime of computer
trespass, such that it is unlawful for any person, with malicious
intent, or now “through intentionally deceptive means and without
authority,” to commit the crime. The General Assembly also specified that a computer hardware or software provider, an interactive
computer service, or a telecommunications or cable operator does
not have to provide notice of its activities to a computer user that
a reasonable computer user should expect may occur.372

369. Act of Mar. 4, 2020, ch. 160, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-388 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
370. Act of Apr. 2, 2020, ch. 601, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-433.2 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
371. Id. at __.
372. Act of Apr. 7, 2020, ch. 821, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-152.4 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).

